Browsing by Author "Kubiak, Adam Paweł"

Now showing 1 - 5 of 5
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    Diversity of macrophytes in riverine aquatic habitats: comparing active river channel and its cut-offs
    (2014) Kubiak, Adam Paweł; Krawczyk, Rafał
    The study area was a small lowland river valley (the Leg river) located in the south-east of Poland. The object of investigation was the macrophytes of 10 river lakes with corresponding active river channel stretches of the same length as the cut-offs. The aim was to check the difference in species diversity between cut-off and active river channels. The second aim was to test the following hypothesis: vegetation of river lake has been shaped under the influence of contiguous river stretch which has left a measurable mark in species abundance and composition. To test this, we checked whether a cut-off channel's flora is more similar to flora of the contiguous river stretch, than to flora of a farther river stretch. During the course of the study it was found that the average species richness was approximately two times higher in the cut-off channels than in the river stretches. The number of the species exclusive for the river lakes was nine times higher in comparison with the river's exclusives (not found in the cut-offs). The Shannon diversity index definitely spoke in favor of the river lakes. These results clearly show the significance of river lakes in maintaining biodiversity of aquatic ecosystems in a small river valley. We did not confirm our hypothesis concerning floristic relation between an active channel and its cut-offs. The floristic similarity between a given cut-off channel and the contiguous active river channel stretch is not stronger than the similarity between this lake and more distant river stretches. The cause of such a state of affairs may be high natural dynamics of investigated habitats and anthropogenic transformation of the river valley.
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    Jerzy Neyman’s Conception of Scientific Inference and Its Relation to Bayesianism
    (2019-02-06) Kubiak, Adam Paweł
    The main thesis of the dissertation was that Neyman’s frequentist statistical paradigm is not a worse tool for conducting scientific research than the Bayesian paradigm. We found the statement to be justified by the following results demonstrated by us: (1) various types of knowledge, pre-existing the research, regarding the examined aspect of reality as well as the socio-economic aspects that accompany the research, are used by Neyman in an unambiguous, correct way that increases the epistemic reliability of his method, (2) Neyman's testing method is always epistemically reliable and, appropriately used, can be epistemically reliable at the desired level, (3) the influence of non-cognitive values directly introduced to the inferential patterns of Neyman's methods of estimation and testing is a favorable solution due to the increase in the epistemic reliability of the method, (4) decision-theoretic interpretation for a single result in Neyman’s statistical scheme does not have to be considered a disadvantage of the method as a tool for conducting scientific research.
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    Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Testing, Epistemic Reliability and Pragmatic Value-Laden Asymmetric Error Risks
    (Springer, 2021-03-18) Kubiak, Adam Paweł; Kawalec, Paweł; Kiersztyn, Adam
    We show that if among the tested hypotheses the number of true hypotheses is not equal to the number of false hypotheses, then Neyman-Pearson theory of testing hypotheses does not warrant minimal epistemic reliability (the feature of driving to true conclusions more often than to false ones). We also argue that N-P does not protect from the possible negative effects of the pragmatic value-laden unequal setting of error probabilities on N-P’s epistemic reliability. Most importantly, we argue that in the case of a negative impact no methodological adjustment is available to neutralize it, so in such cases the discussed pragmatic-value-ladenness of N-P inevitably compromises the goal of attaining truth.
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    Scientific essentialism in the light of classification practice in biology – a case study of phytosociology.
    (Komitet Naukoznawstwa PAN, 2012) Kubiak, Adam Paweł; Wodzisz, Rafał R.
    In our paper we investigate the difficulty that arises when one tries to reconsiliate essentialist’s thinking with classification practice in the biological sciences. The article outlines some varieties of essentialism with particular attention to the version defended by Brian Ellis. We underline the basic difference: Ellis thinks that essentialism is not a viable position in biology due to its incompatibility with biological typology and other essentialists think that these two elements can be reconciled. However, both parties have in common metaphysical starting point and they lack explicit track of methodological procedures. Methodological inquiry involves less demanding assumptions than metaphysical, and therefore it is justified to analyse abovementioned discrepancy between Ellis and other essentialist in this context. We do it by bottom-up investigation which focuses on the practice of taxonomists in the particular field of biology. A case study helps us to discover four characteristics of biological typology practice: impossibility of algorithmization, relativity, subjectivity and conventionality. These features prove non-realistic and therefore anti-essentialistic character of biological classification. We conclude by saying that any essentialism related to the notion of biological kind cannot be regarded as justified by scientific enterprise of creating typologies.
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    The epistemic consequences of pragmatic value-laden scientific inference
    (Springer, 2021-05-18) Kubiak, Adam Paweł; Kawalec, Paweł
    In this work, we explore the epistemic import of the value-ladenness of Neyman-Pearson’s Theory of Testing Hypotheses (N-P) by reconstructing and extending Daniel Steel’s argument for the legitimate influence of pragmatic values on scientific inference. We focus on how to properly understand N-P’s pragmatic value-ladenness and the epistemic reliability of N-P. We develop an account of the twofold influence of pragmatic values on N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability. We refer to these two distinguished aspects as “direct” and “indirect”. We discuss the replicability of experiments in terms of the indirect aspect and the replicability of outcomes in terms of the direct aspect. We argue that the influence of pragmatic values is beneficial to N-P’s epistemic reliability and replicability indirectly. We show that while the direct influence of pragmatic values can be beneficial, its negative effects on reliability and replicability are also unavoidable in some cases, with the direct and indirect aspects possibly being incongruent.